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ESTOPPEL BY INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
OR OPINION IN SALES AND USE TAX CASES
By

RICHARD

H.

WAGNER*

S

INCE many sales and use taxes have a broad base and are relatively complex,
the volume of regulatory materials and administrative decisions is probably
greater in this area than in any other field of tax administration. For the same
reasons, contacts with agency personnel regarding the application of the tax
are more frequent. It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts to resort to
estoppel are not unusual in sales tax enforcement. This was borne out in Pennsylvania's administrative experience when a 1 per cent sales and use tax was
enacted in 1953,1 followed by the 3 per cent (now 4 per cent) Selective Sales
and Use Tax Act of 1956 with its maze of exemptions, exclusions and exceptions.'
Apart from its central office, the Pennsylvania agency has 22 field offices
throughout the State, approximately 160 field auditors and 270 investigators.
Personal contacts and telephone calls between covered vendors (approximately
200,000) and agency employees are numbered in the thousands weekly. With
the possible exception of the Bureau of Employment Security, the Sales Tax
Bureau is called upon to assist more people on program application than any
other state agency. Although most of its estoppel cases originated in the earlier
years of the tax, the Bureau is understandably concerned that even today, with
its complex and far-flung operations, future estoppel arguments may arise. It is
certain that if the rule of estoppel were held applicable to informal opinions of
sales tax employees the agency could expect a large volume and infinite variety
of controversies on this point. To avoid precedents which would open the door
to such administrative chaos, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Sales and 'Use Tax and
the Sales Tax Board have steadfastly adhered to the rule that estoppel is not
operative against the Commonwealth. Cases and materials collected on the
subject are presented herewith for the benefit of others who may be faced with
similar problems.
All authorities agree that the first requisite of an estoppel is that the person
against whom the estoppel is asserted must have engaged in conduct amounting
* B.S. Dickinson College; LL.B. Dickinson School of Law; formerly Counsel Penna. Board
of Review; Executive Secretary State Advisory Council for Unemployment Compensation; Legal
Assistant to Director of Employment Security; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law 19461958; Chief Counsel, Bureau of Sales and Use Tax, Pennsylvania Department of Revenue.
1 Act of 1953, P.L. 377.
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3403 (1956). Later amended by Acts of 1959, No. 14 and No. 131.
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to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts., In the sales tax cases
this basic requirement is not met. No misrepresentation of fact has been made.
An erroneous statement by a government employee that a taxpayer is not liable
for collection and remittance of tax is a mistake of law, not a misrepresentation
of fact. Vendors seeking excuse from tax liability on such grounds have, therefore, failed to establish the basis for asserting an estoppel.4
The vendors agree with the principle established by numerous cases that no
estoppel can be asserted against the Commonwealth.' However, they argue that
since, under the Sales and Use Tax Act, a vendor is personally and directly liable
for tax only if he has failed to collect tax from his purchaser, a distinction should
be made where a representative of the Commonwealth has told a vendor he is
not liable for collection of tax. They contend that estoppel should apply in
such cases.
The Pennsylvania Sales and Use Tax Act gives the agency the option to hold
accountable either the vendor who has failed to collect tax or the purchaser who
has failed to pay tax on a taxable transfer.6 The legal right of the Commonwealth to proceed initially against the vendor, purchaser, or both is clear. The
act makes no distinction between primary and secondary or direct and indirect
liability of a purchaser and vendor. The argument for the attempted distinction
is that vendors, who have relied on representation made by government employees and have failed, therefore, to collect the tax, would often have to bear an
inequitable burden, since in many cases it would be impractical or impossible to
collect the tax from the purchasers when a later claim is made by the governaPOMEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE 805 (5th ed. 1941).

For the elements of estoppel, see Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Par. 805 (5th Ed. 1941).
In Northwestern Nat'l. Bank v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 192 at page 198, 27 A.2d at 23, 24
(1942) the court stated: "If the truth be known to both parties, or if they have equal means of
knowledge, there can be no estoppel . . .one is not relieved who has the means of becoming
acquainted with the extent of his rights."
4It is true that estoppel has rarely been applied to government and frequently to taxpayers.
This is because a taxpayer's claim of estoppel will, in most cases, be the result of inquiries made
of an administrative official for advise regarding the taxable or non-taxable nature of a given
transaction or transactions. Under these circumstances, the "representation" made by the government official is merely an expression of his opinion as to the taxable or non-taxable nature of the
transaction based on his understanding of the law, which unfortunately may be inaccurate. Atlas,
Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax Cases, 3 TAX L. REv. 71.
5Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. 442, 12 At. 453 (1949); Delaware Division Canal
Co. v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 399, 134 At. 407 (1865); Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab
Co., 287 Pa. 161, 134 Atl. 404 (1926); New Castle City v. Whithers, 291 Pa. 216, 139 Atl. 860
(1927); Commonwealth v. Central Nat'l. Bank, 293 Pa. 404, 143 At. 105 (1928); Commonwealth
v. Taylor's Ex'rs., 297 Pa. 335, 147 Atl. 71 (1929); Cumberland County v. Lemoyne Trust Co.,
318 Pa. 85, 178 At. 28 (1935); Commonwealth v. A. M. Byers Co., 346 Pa. 555, 31 A.2d 530
(1943); cert. denied 320 U.S. 757 (1943); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Board of Fin. & Rev.,
368 Pa. 463, 84 A.2d 495 (1951); Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 377 Pa. 312, 105 A.2d
336 (1954).
6
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3403-2(m), 3403-201 (1955), 403-546(2) (1957).
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ment. This argument is not supported by decisions in other jurisdictions administering sales and use tax statutes comparable to the Pennsylvania act.
In Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue,7 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that sales of ceramic tile and accessories to tile contractors constituted "sales at retail" within the Louisiana act. In reaching their decision, the
Court stated that the refusal of the State's Deputy Collector of Revenue to
grant the vendor its dealers' registration certificates on the ground that it was
not liable for the tax did not estop the state from thereafter collecting the tax
and the penalties due. It is interesting to note that the Collector's refusal was
given on two separate occasions.
In Michigan Sportservice v. Nims,8 the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled
that sales of programs, score cards and racing forms, which carried advertising
matter, to numerous customers by concessionaires at baseball games and race
tracks were taxable sales and not exempt as "commercial advertising," since such
advertising was not included in the programs, etc., on special order of the customers as required by the sales tax statute. The court handed down this decision
despite the taxpayer's contention that a departmental regulation in effect at
the time the sales in question occurred made such sales exempt. In so ruling the
court said,
Plaintiffs contend that the sales in which the assessments in controversy
were based were exempt from taxation on the ground that the subject matter
thereof was commercial advertising within the meaning of the provisions of
the statute and of the rule (i. e. departmental regulation), above quoted. The
provisions of the rule must, of course, be construed in connection with the
statute itself. In case of conflict, the latter governs. It is not within the power
of the Department of Revenue to extend the scope of the act .... For equally
cogent reasons the rules and regulations of the Department may not grant exemptions not authorized by the legislature. 9
In Henderson v. Gill1" the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that a
retail florist was liable for sales tax despite the fact that he had failed to collect
tax on the sales in question because of his reliance on erroneous advice of agents
of the Department of Revenue. In so ruling, the court said:
The case of plaintiffs has an appeal stronger than that which usually
supports a plea of estoppel. The official representations made to them are now
conceded to have been incorrect and misleading, and because of the multitude
of the transactions and want of any record of the purchasers they were thus
7 232 La. 1061, 99 So.2d 345 (1957).
8 319 Mich. 561, 30 N.W.2d 281 (1948).

9Id. at 566, 30 N.W.2d at 283.
10229 N.C. 313, 49 S.E.2d 754 (1948).
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deprived of the opportunity to collect the three percent tax on sales made on
products they were advised were exempt. Moreover, it must be noted that
these plaintiff merchants were statutory agents for the collection of the tax on
sales which were definitely imposed upon the consumer, and their responsibility
arises on the assumption that they must so collect.
These facts, however potent in creating an estoppel in ordinary transactions between individuals, do not estop the State in the exercise of a governmental or sovereign right....
The State cannot, by the conduct of its agents be estopped from collecting
taxes lawfully imposed and remaining unpaid; and under the law as we understand it neither can their conduct or advice create an estoppel against the State
by these retail merchants on the theory of their mere agency since they are the
agent of the law, with a fixed liability to account for the tax imposed .... "I
The government's position is also sustained by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. In United States v. Globe Indemnity Co., 2 the Court
approved a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in which a person
not directly liable for payment of a tax was denied the right to assert estoppel
against the United States Government. In that case a surety had furnished a
bond for a taxpayer. After a series of negotiations the Collector of Internal
Revenue, in response to the taxpayer's request, supplied the taxpayer with a
certified letter stating "There are no unpaid income taxes appearing on the records of this office in your name.... " The surety, relying on the Collector of
Internal Revenue's letter, returned the collateral to the taxpayer. Thereafter,
the government sued and established its right to the taxes in question. The taxpayer was insolvent and the government, therefore, sued the surety on the bond.
The Court ruled that the Collector of Internal Revenue did not have authority
to furnish a tax search binding on the Commissioner and also that he could not
be estopped by the erroneous interpretations of the law communicated by his
agents to taxpayers or persons secondarily liable for the amounts owed by a
taxpayer.1
1

1 d. at 316, 49 S.E.2d at 756. See also State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160
So. 77 (1934); Dent. v. Obert, 144 Ohio St. 492, 59 N.E.2d 931 (1945); Crane Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n., 63 Ariz. 426, 163 P.2d 656 (1945); Arizona State Tax Comm'n. v. Frank
Harmonson Co. Metal Products, 63 Ariz. 452, 163 P.2d 667 (1945): In Duhame v. State Tax
Comm'n., 65 Ariz. 268, 281, 179 P.2d 252, 260 (1947) the Supreme Court of Arizona said, "It
is true that during the time plaintiff was engaged in the contracting here in question he might
have passed this tax on to the government had he not been misled, by an improper interpretation
of the Act by The Commission, into believing no tax was due. Still, it is the settled law of the
land and of this jurisdiction that as taxation is a governmental function, there can be no estoppel
against a government or governmental agency with reference to the enforcement of taxes. Were
this not the rule the taxing officials could waive most of the state's revenue."
1294 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied 304 U.S. 575 (1938).
ia The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the immunity of government from
claims of estoppel asserted by taxpayers in the case of Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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In support of their argument" some Pennsylvania vendors have cited the
case of Commonwealth v. Welsbach Co.' 5
In that case agents of the Commonwealth notified a corporation prior to
1900 that it need not assess and collect tax upon its corporate indebtedness under
the provisions of the applicable statute. In December 1906 the Auditor General
informed the corporation of the current Commonwealth's position, which was
that the corporation should pay the tax in question. The Commonwealth subsequently sued the corporation for the tax for the period 1900 to 1911. The
Dauphin County Court ruled that the corporation was liable for tax for the
period 1907 to 1911 and that it was not liable for the payment for the period
1900 to 1906, since the corporation was merely the collector of the tax. The
court maintained that to require the corporation to pay the tax for the period
1900 to 1906, after it had relied on the representations of the Commonwealth's
agents that no tax had to be collected, would impose a penalty upon the corporation since it had failed to collect tax from the bondholders and would probably no longer be able to recover from said bondholders the amount of tax payable to the Commonwealth.
The Welsbach case was decided in 1913. In a more recent case (1956)
before the same court, Commonwealth v. I.T.E. Circuit Breaker Co.,'" the
Dauphin County Court, holding that the Commonwealth cannot be estopped
by actions of any of its officers in the performance of a governmental function,
said:
The defendant argues that Commonwealth v. Welsbach, 16 Dauphin
County Reports, 130 (1913) supports his contention. We think not. The
court there held that they were dealing with a penalty rather than with a tax
due. Furthermore, if that case should be construed contra to the Western
Maryland Railway case . . . the latter would of necessity prevail.'7
The Western MarylandRailway case,' 8 cited by the Dauphin County Court,
held that a corporation, which was required by law to act as an agent of the
Commonwealth in collecting tax on interest paid to the corporation's bond1It
has been suggested that the vendor's position is strengthened by decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that the appraisement of an inheritance tax appraiser is binding
on the Commonwealth. See Heberton Estate, 351 Pa. 564, 41 A.2d 654 (1945); Darsie Estate,
354 Pa. 540, 47 A.2d 815 (1946).
These cases hold only that the Commonwealth and the
taxpayer are bound by a res judicata determination of a quasi-judicial official where no timely
appeal is taken from his determination. They are not in point in deciding the question of whether
or not a taxpayer is bound by erroneous legal advice given orally and informally by an administrative employee.
15 16 Pa. Dauphin County Rep. 130 (1913).
1669 Pa. Dauphin County Rep. 265 (1956).
'7 Id. at 267.
'8 Commonwealth v. Western Md. Ry., 377 Pa. 312, 105 A.2d 366 (1954).
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holders, could not assert estoppel against the Commonwealth. Mr. Chief Justice
Stern, speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, said:
It is a fundamental legal principle that a State or other sovereignty cannot
be estopped by any acts or conduct of its officers or agents in the performance
of a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary function. No errors
or misinformation of officers or agents can estop the government from collecting taxes legally due. However firmly established the rule as to private individuals or corporations that where a person has been induced to act to his detriment by the representations of an -agent he can hold the principal on the theory

of estoppel, that rule does not apply when a government is the principal . . .
the rights of the Commonwealth are not liable to be compromised by the

nonfeasance of her agents. Nor can her debtor escape through the mistake
of her servants acknowledging a sum less than the whole due, as received in
full.19
This language is forceful, direct and persuasive in sales tax cases even though
the issuing corporation in the Western Maryland Railway case had issued the
bonds tax free.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down a similar ruling in Cumberland County v. Lemoyne Trust Co.2" In that case a statute imposed tax on
the interest payments made by a trust company to holders of certain certificates.
The County Commissioners had demanded and received the taxes for the year
in question from some of the holders of the certificates. The trust company,
knowing of this practice, did not withhold and remit the tax on its interest payments to certificate holders. Despite the fact that the trust company was essentially a collecting agent for the county and the fact that the County Commissioners had made no effort prior to the year in question to assess the tax against
the trust company, the court ruled that the trust company could not assert
estoppel against the government.
Although the postion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the question
of government estoppel is clear, vendors have contended that the result reached
by that court in the Western Maryland Railway and Lemoyne Trust Co. cases
is not fair as applied to them. Let us examine this contention. It should be
noted that most of the claimed exemptions allegedly were "granted" through
the medium of informal conversations in which administrators gave to vendors
or lawyers their own views on a question of law, that no confirming regulatory
or written exemption was issued, and that no portion of the Selective Sales and
Use Tax Act authorized the agency employee to grant such an exemption.
19 Id. at 320, 105 A.2d at 341.
20 318 Pa. 85, 178 At. 32 (1935).
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It must be remembered that we are not dealing in these cases with an agreement authorizing prospective remittances of tax under a formula granted by
the Bureau pursuant to Regulation 502 and Section 581 of the Pennsylvania
act." If such an agreement reflects a taxpayer's true liability with reasonable
accuracy, it is clearly an exercise of power within the limits of the authority
granted to the Department by the Legislature. Further, we are not dealing with
a taxpayer's reliance on an officially promulgated and published rule or regulation. In the rare event of a regulatory amendment imposing tax, it is the general
practice of the Pennsylvania Bureau to apply such amendments only prospectively
2
to vendors previously ruled to be non-taxable.
What we are dealing with here is a claim of complete freedom from liability
for tax based on actions of an administrative official in no way authorized by
statute to so act. The Pennsylvania Selective Sales and Use Tax Act gives the
Department authority to make inquiries, determinations, and assessments of
the tax imposed by the'act.23 It also authorizes the Department to prescribe and
promulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the
act. 4 Such rules and regulations, following their approval as to legality, are
filed in the Department of State in accordance with Section 21 of the Administrative Agency Law of 1945,25 whereupon they officially become effective. This
is far removed from legislative authorization of an administrative employee to
grant orally and informally to an individual taxpayer a dispensation from liability based on the employee's own mistake of law. Can it be said that a vendor
has acted prudently and reasonably in soliciting and relying on an agency employee's informal oral opinion regarding liability under the act? Is it desirable
to have tax liability under a legislative enactment depend not upon the standards
prescribed by the legislature but upon the statements and conduct of government
employees with respect to each individual ? 26
Much has been said of the "unfairness" of the rule that prevents a taxpayer
from asserting an estoppel against the government. It is contended that modern
21

2 CCH STATE TAx CAS. REP. PA.

61016.

Bureau Regulation No. 1 so provides. See footnote 26. This is in accord with the results
reached in City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Pa. D. & C. 343 (1945), and Hoffman
Query as to whether a taxing
v. City of Syracuse, 2 N. Y. 2d 484, 141 N.E.2d 605 (1957).
agency has the power to make interpretative regulations effecitve only prospectively in the absence of a legislative grant of such authority. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 7805(b), under
which the Secretary or his delegate is expressly authorized to prescribe the extent to which any ruling
or regulation may be applied without retroactive effect.
23 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72 § 3403-540(1956).
24
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72 § 3403-380(1955).
25 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 71 § 1710.21(1945).
26 Adoption of the position that any taxpayer who has been erroneously advised that a transaction is not taxable is excused from tax apparently would conflict with the uniformity requirement
of Article IX, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It would also produce chaos in the
enforcement of tax laws.
22
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society should not harbor the ancient rule that "the sovereign can do no harm,"
and the argument paints a word picture of the hapless individual victimized by
an educated colossus going its irresponsible way at the expense of individual
rights. This argument ignores the realities on which the doctrine against estoppel has subsisted through years of self government in common law jurisdictions.
The rights to be considered in these cases are those of private interests in
relation to the public interest. In this relation the individual has a right to
expect fair and honest dealings from his government 27 and considerate, courteous treatment at the hands of its officials. On the other side, individuals
dealing with agents of the public should act with candor and a higher degree
of care than might be expected in purely private transactions. Any idea that
public agents and employees are possessed of legal infallibility or knowledge
and skills superior to everyone else is not borne out by common experience or
records of past litigation. Even judicial and quasi-judicial branches of government, responsible for high level review and resolution of legal questions, divide,
reverse, rule and overrule in their search for the law. In every case heard and
decided there are at least two theories of the correct result, and government,
unfortunately, does not have a corner on the most expert opinion, legal or otherwise. In areas not covered by specific rule and regulation, the individual, particularly the practitioner, who queries a public employee more often than not
has knowledge or access to knowledge equal or superior to that of the public
servant. When the facts are probed, the public is just as likely to be the innocent
victim of a knowledgeable individual as the other way around.
In appraising the "fairness" of the rule in question, one must also consider
the practical difficulties inherent in any other method of protecting the Commonwealth against loss of revenue and fraud. One way which has been suggested
is to "inform administrative employees that they should refrain from giving
legal advice." Upon reflection, it must occur to anyone with first-hand experience that the erring employee usually is unaware that he is giving "legal advice;"
rather, he honestly thinks there is no serious question as to the matter on which
he speaks. He may be completely wrong in his premise, or the facts supplied
him may be woefully inadequate for any determination, but he realizes none of
this. The levels at which such errors may be made are not limited to inferior
positions. It is axiomatic that higher echelons in public as well as in private
management deal with general rather than specific problems. There is, perhaps,
27

An assessed taxpayer, for example, is entitled to ample notice of the basis of the assessment

so that he may clearly understand the grounds on which it is based, and even the necessary schedules
which reflect the tax liability are his to examine in order that he may have a fair hearing of his
case. Decision of the Board at Docket No. 399 (May 15, 1958).
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less danger of serious specific misapplication of the law on the part of rank and
file operating officials than at some higher levels of management.
Of course, there are bound to be cases in which the mistaken employee
was careless in making the statements in question. However, it must be assumed
that, if a rule of government estoppel were adopted, situations would occur in
which government employees would give erroneous advice to enable others with
whom they are acting in concert to evade legal liability. How this latter situation
could be detected and overcome is something Which should give pause to anyone
espousing the theory that the public loses and private interests gain whenever
a government employee makes mistakes.
If this rule of government estoppel became law, it would mean that all
employees in positions where their mistakes could bind the public would have
to be bonded. For, would it not be ridiculous to hold that an employee who
handles public monies and negotiable securities must be insured, and that an
employee who can amputate a million dollar public claim by erroneous and
unauthorized legal advice requires no bond?
Finally, a vendor who is uncertain as to the taxability of transactions is not
without methods of obtaining a definitive ruling. He has several practical alternatives for obtaining an official determination of the law as applied to his situation. He may request the promulgation of a rule or regulation which, when
filed in the Department of State will protect him, and all other vendors alike,
from retroactive revisions with penal effect. He may declare certain typical
transactions on which he has not collected the tax, receive an assessment and
petition for hearing and review, or he may pay the tax and petition for hearing
and refund. In these instances, if he has disclosed all of the facts of his situation,
the possibility of a subsequent overruling of the decision will be remote.2 8 Since
the vendor has these methods of obtaining an administrative ruling, it is only
reasonable that he should be required to use them rather than rely on the advice
of officials whose determinations should not bind the government.
28 See Appendix "A" to Sales Tax Regulations No. 1 for procedure under which a taxpayer
may obtain an official decision or ruling. However, even where petition for refund has been heard
and allowed, our Legislature has expressly provided that the Commonwealth may, within the prescribed period of limitation, recover the amount of the refund if it was erroneously granted.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72 § 3403-542.1 (1955).
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